What did the UK Government know about BT's Phorm Trials?

In letters to privacy campaigners and answers to questions raised in the House of Lords by Baroness Sue Miller of Chilthorne Domer the government disclaim any knowledge of the illegal BT / Phorm trials of 2006 and 2007, when BT customers had their internet connections intercepted and profiled by the ISP and its partner. This leaves us with a worrying conundrum. Was it as Lord West stated in the House of Lords, the fact that neither the Home Office nor any other government department had any prior knowledge of the trials^[1], or it this a coverup of government skullduggery?

A Brief History of Phorm

Even in its previous incarnation as 121Media, Phorm was no stranger to controversy with its software being dubbed by some security software vendors as, malware and rootkits, and the firm itself as a spyware distributor. Phorm's PeopleOnPage spyware, which it calls "adware" was notoriously difficult to eradicate once a PC was infected.^[2] In 2005 complaints by the Center for Democracy and Technology to the FTC in the US, and the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Internet Center to Canadian legal authorities at the same time, prompted a change of name and a move to the UK.

BT Management: Ian Livingston and Stratis Scleparis

Under the guidance of Ian Livingston - BT Retail's boss,^[3] Stratis Scleparis - BT's then Chief Technology Officer and Kent Ertugrul the CEO of Phorm, BT became embroiled in the worst public relations disaster in its history. Two covert trials carried out in 2006 and 2007 were uncovered by some of BT's own customers, prompting a public outcry. BT at first denied any wrongdoing but were forced to admit the illegal interception of its customers and the breach of their privacy. After the setting up of the system on BT's infrastructure Stratis Scleparis left BT and moved to Phorm as its CTO.

UK Government and the Security Services, unaware of Illegal Interceptions by Phorm

If the authorities were as unaware of BT's actions as they maintain^[4] then that means that the security services were oblivious of the fact that Russian software coders had installed illegal monitoring equipment on the nation's telecommunications infrastructure.^[5] If they were aware then this government took part in an exercise to illegally monitor its citizens. The question now is, which is worse, complicity or ineptitude?

The government has closed its doors on Freedom of Information Act requests for information on this subject.^[6] The Cabinet Office have refused to answer any questions on the subject of Phorm, but are unable to tell us who in the government authorised this course of action stating they have no records. Had they not been so keen to promote the interests of BT and Phorm and dismiss the concerns of concerned citizens, whom they are duty bound to protect, their denial would not be so suspect. Complaints from the public invoked the intervention of the European Commissioner for Telecoms, Ms. Viviane Reding and the UK government were called to account for their failure to implement European directives on privacy. Following two requests by the Commission for the British government to explain themselves, the situation is yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of the Commission and could result in the UK being taken to the European Court.^[7]

Links between Phorm and the UK Government

Privacy activists have uncovered links between the government and Phorm which pre-date the 2006/7 trials prompting them to ask when exactly this government became aware of the presence of Phorm and their intentions.^[8] Attempts to illicit information from OFCOM for the period have been rebuffed by the regulator prompting questions about what their Chief Policy Officer for that period Kip Meek, now a Phorm board member, knew or didn't know.^[9] Questions to BERR have also been rebuffed stating that the request would exceed the financial limit imposed by the FOI act.
The CPS have been reviewing the case for a prosecution of BT for twelve months and up to this date no action or information has been forthcoming.

The Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) has investigated the Phorm technology and found it to be illegal under Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) and Richard Clayton, security researcher at Cambridge University also concurs that the technology is illegal under RIPA.

So we return to the question of trust. Do you trust this government to have acted honourably and to have answered truthfully that they had no prior knowledge? If you do then that leaves them open to, at the very least, a charge of gross incompetence and dereliction of duty and if they had any honour they would resign. If you do not believe their answers to be truthful and honest and are not convinced that they knew nothing of the trials, then they are guilty of a most serious breach of the law and a most serious abuse of power. In this case they should be removed from office and face the most severe penalty of the law. No matter which way they squirm one or other of these scenarios is the correct one and no amount of spin or obfuscation or delay can alter the fact.
Which is it Mr. Brown, complicity or incompetence?

UK Government and Phorm References

1. www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2008-09-29a.337.6 - 29th September 2008, just before the 2008 trial of Phorm's Webwise by BT
   www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldhansrd/text/90423-0010.htm - 23rd April 2009: Column 1664, onwards www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/dates_of_meetings_between_home_o#comment-2535thes
   www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/statement_by_phorm_regarding_com#comment-2559
   GCHQ and Internet Insecurity - Summary: The Cabinet Office has four key sources of information that should have alerted them to illegal mass surveillance. The Central Sponsor for Information Assurance, the Communications and Electronic Security Group, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, as well as intelligence provided by the UK Security Services
    
2. blogs.zdnet.com/Spyware/index.php?p=820
   www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Spyware-Rootkit-Maker-Stops-Distribution/
   www.f-secure.com/sw-desc/apropos.shtml
   These above articles appeared in May 2006, a few months before BT and 121Media (name changed to Phorm) began to trial the ISP hosted version of the 'adware' software during September and October 2006.
   http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/03/07/phorm_interview_burgess_ertegrul/ - confirmation that PeopleOnPage, 121Media and Phorm are all the same programmers
    
3. www.theregister.co.uk/2008/04/08/bt_livingstone_ceo/
    
4. www.theregister.co.uk/2008/06/18/home_office_phorm_meetings/ - June 2008 refering to a meeting during August 2007 between Phorm and the Home Office
    
5. Phorm's interim and final Financial Statements for 2005 and 2006 mention signed agreements and tests with major internation ISPs with the UK being specifically mentioned for trials.
   www.phorm.com/investors/financial_reports.html
   Tests on BT's network had progressed to live customer trials during 2006.
    
6. www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/15949/response/41464/attach/html/2/REPLY%20FOI%20267%20766.pdf.html
    
7. www.theregister.co.uk/2009/04/14/eu_phorm_formal/
    
8. www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/2005_correspondence_between_home#outgoing-29993
   www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/correspondence_between_121mediap#outgoing-29979
    
9. www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/correspondence_between_kip_meek#outgoing-30170
    

With grateful thanks to PengusPeriritus, a poster on BadPhorm.co.uk, who has done much through Freedom of Information requests to unearth this sorry saga and provided the above summary, dated October 2009.
 

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